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Latter-day reinterpretations of the process of thinking have 
been suggested along two different lines. The various classical 
descriptions of thought from the Aristotelian down to that of the 
contemporary analytical psychology have shown in varying 
degrees the interpretation of it as intel-lectualistic and as self-
contained. Of late years the writings of the pragmatists (whose 
philosophy really 'takes off' from this psychological insight) have 
made clearer in its implications for a Weltanschauung the 
viewpoint of the functional school in psychology. For this school 
"reasoning is always for a subjective interest," "thinking is set up in 
situations of stress and problems," "ideas, meanings are cues or 
leads to further dealing with the object or situation," "inductive 
reasoning is the seeking for a general interpretation under which 
the given data may assume some shape that can be dealt with 
effectively," etc. A very different line of re-interpretation is that 
taken by the behaviorists. For them "thinking is a matter of implicit 
responses," "one's reactions to a stimulus may be shunted away 
from the grosser skeletal musculature and through the more refined 
musculature of the vocal apparatus," "habits of thought are 
laryngeal habits," etc. 
The behavioristic emphasis—or, more accurately, the emphasis of 
the behaviorists—has been upon a certain type of physiological 
process as the essential thing in thinking. Now as has been 
recognized by Tolman and others, a behaviorism is not necessarily 
nor essentially physiological; its legitimate primary emphasis is 
upon the importance of the 'biological situation' in which the 
organism 'behaves' with reference to its environmental 
circumstances. (Here the line of emphasis 54 
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would seem to merge with that of the functionalists.) Whatever 
intraorganic processes are found to occur may be of great value in 
bridging gaps in the purely behavioristic account of phenomena, 
but as intraorganic they are not behavior. A confusion of the 
converse sort seems also to be abroad. Emphasis upon a 
physiological description as being in the last analysis the only 
explanatory description is widely enough held among all brands of 
psychologists; and any particular line of emphasis on the 
physiological side, such as upon the part played by vocal 
mechanisms, does not legitimately set one off as a behaviorist. 
In expansion of this point attention should be called to another 
current misunderstanding. The ascription of thinking to vocal, 
gestural, or other bodily processes is not in itself any challenge to 
the legitimacy of introspective descriptions for the plain reason that 
this is only a move to substitute what is thought to be a more 
adequate physiological basis for a less adequate one. Stripped of 
other motives that are not necessarily and essentially affiliated with 
this, we have here only a revision of one of the assumptions of 
practically all psychological doctrines heretofore, namely, that the 
physiological mechanism underlying thought processes is the 
cerebrum and the cerebrum alone; and a recasting of this into the 
form of a more inclusive and extensive mechanism. The change is 
from one physiological to another physiological description; and 
no further implications necessarily follow as to the value or as to 
the legitimacy of descriptions of thinking in terms of the conscious 
experiences of the thinker. Confusion on this really obvious point 
is, the writer feels, at the bottom of some contemporary discussion. 
Let us look more closely at this change in the physiological 
point of view. On the traditional conception, the bodily mechanism 
at work when one thinks consists of one or more neural impulses 
that reach some area of the cortex, then, instead of passing more or 
less immediately to some motor organs as in activity involving 
unthinking awareness, shift along association fibres to another 
cortical area, thence to another, etc.; making a picture of impulses 
shooting back 
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and forth, here, there, and elsewhere, all between innumerable 
cortical centers, and the whole field of operation being comprised 
within the cerebrum. With the realization of the ludicrousness of 
reasoning conceived in the ancient classical way as a self-contained 
and self-maintained operation, recognition has been increasingly 
allowed to the functions of some sensory stimulus to the reasoning 
and some motor outcome from it; but during the process of 
reasoning itself, i.e. after the afferent nerves had delivered their 
burden to the cerebral centers and before the efferent nerves had 
received theirs for conveyance to effectors, these peripheral mecha-
nisms have still been considered inoperative and inactive (so far as 
the above thinking process is concerned). The succession of ideas 
experienced by the subject in his chain of reasoning is then 
traceable to (or paralleled by, or the other aspect of) the succession 
of cells or of cell-constellations at which the shifting, shunting 
nervous impulses arrive and leave. It should legitimately follow 
that the anatomical locus of a given idea (so far as it has any) is 
some theoretically localizable cluster of cortical neurons; but 
protests against this inference may be respected without affecting 
the point at issue. 
An incidental query concerning this mode of interpretation may 
be stated. What factor or factors determine that the impulses shall 
at certain moments in this story continue to shoot about inside the 
cerebrum and, on the other hand, at a certain moment leave the 
cerebrum by efferent channels? Is it wholly a matter of what cells 
happen to be traversed, so that when the neural impulses chance to 
travel to motor centers they are then transferred to the peripherally 
bound tracts, but when on the contrary they travel to non-motor 
centers the nature of the connections made there are such as to re-
direct them to other parts of the cerebrum? Or, shall we look for 
some inhibitory factor—perhaps in the form of certain other nerve 
impulses a-going inside the cerebrum inhibiting the first?    But this 
problem is incidental. 
As a contrast to this intracerebral view of the physiological 
aspect of thinking, let us consider the peripheral view.    It 
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might be more accurately styled a peripheral-central-peripheral-
central-peripheral view. In essence, the difference between the 
intracerebral interpretation and this one can be put in terms of the 
stimulus-response circuit concept. For the former, thinking is 
statable as a complication, refinement, prolongation, elaboration, 
etc., of the central segment of the whole 'reflex arc' The simpler 
human activities involve fairly close and immediate connections 
between afferent and efferent pathways, shading down to the 
simplest reflexes; but as organization or integration of these 
simpler acts into more complex ones progresses, the central 
associative phases become more and more important, until in 
deliberative thinking these central connections are found to be 
indefinitely complicated, involving in part a great elongation of the 
total pathway traversed by the impulse from the place and time of 
its first arrival at the center to the place and time of its ultimate 
leaving the center. In contrast with this, on the peripheral 
interpretation the associative pathways serve merely as connectors 
between peripheral tracts; the connectors being subject to an 
enormous amount of modification, to be sure, but this modification 
being largely limited in character to the joining and disjoining of 
simultaneously and successively operating central connections, and 
little if any to the hitching end-to-end of merely central paths in a 
serial order, as according to the other view. In other words, the 
emphasis is here upon whole arcs. Modification of human activity 
is on the anatomical side largely describable as joinings and 
disjoinings of whole arcs. Where modification does produce a 
serial pattern of organization, this is due to a serial hitching 
together of the whole arcs. 
This description of the physical side of the process of thinking 
in terms of the interplay of entire sensori-motor circuits instead of 
merely the central segments thereof, possesses on its face the 
advantage of fitting in with the undeniable modern tendency to 
interpret psychological phenomena as reducible to a matter of 
stimulus-and-response circuits. 
The train of ideas and the mental seesaw of deliberation 
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experienced by the thinking person, are on this physical view, a 
matter of sensori-central-motor arcs active in various relations to 




{A) In the first place, there is the phenomenon of 'thoughts' in 
series, a train of 'ideas.' This is theoretically describable on the 
physiological side as a series of sensorimotor activities, occurring 
in succession. In pattern the 'ideas' resemble (in last analysis, are) 
the part-processes in a serial habit. A diagram of the latter will help 
to clarify the point (see Fig. I). An afferent impulse originating at 
peripheral sense-organ S, arouses by central connection C, the 
motor response at M; this indirectly—through excitation of 
receptors resident in a muscle tissue by the very contraction of the 
latter, or through excitation of receptors situated in the vicinity and 
sensitive to certain changes produced in the vicinity by the 
effectors—arouses a second sensory impulse from S, which in turn 
arouses through a center C, another motor response M, etc. Now, 
according to this view, the serial character of thinking is 
physiologically a process to which this scheme is applicable, the 
sequence of experiences the subject calls his 'ideas' being 
describable as the sequence of motor adjustments arousing each 
other in turn, and not as the sequence of intracerebral shuntings of 
associative impulses represented in Fig. 2. A challenge may be 
anticipated: How can an idea be represented physiologically as the 
activity of an arc?   To such a challenge the most 
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convenient retort would be: How, on the other hand, can an idea be 
represented physiologically as the activity of a group of cortical 
neurons or as the passage of an association impulse? A more 
serious attempt to meet the need will be made below. 
Meanwhile we must consider the other well-recognized trait of 
thinking taken in its narrower sense: (B) that thinking involves 
some seesaw, some competing alternatives.    Sher- 
 
rington has familiarized us with the notion of reaction systems as 
being allied or antagonistic, reinforcing and inhibiting with 
reference to each other. And nothing resembles the introspective 
phenomena of thinking more than some of the interrelations of 
reaction arcs. On the one hand, the subject reports hesitations, the 
pondering of alternative suggestions, and the final acceptance of 
one either in the non-logical decision or logically after a new 
consideration has appeared and strengthened that alternative; on 
the other hand, we can observe antagonistic reaction systems 
blocking each other on the reception of certain stimuli, other 
systems meanwhile constantly varying in their tension until some 
one of these waxes strong enough to reinforce one of the original 
antagonistic units so that it may appropriate the 'common path.' 
But observe! The 'consideration' that enters to reinforce 
successfully one of the competing tendencies is in the more 
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logical types of judgment not wholly from 'without' the individual, 
not merely an enhancement of an external environmental 
stimulation, but is from 'within' his own 'mind.' Clearly, then, we 
must make room for just those 'inside' reaction systems pointed out 
in the diagrams above. 
The James-Lange theory of the emotions, especially the broader 
statement of the position by James, has in it much more 
suggestiveness than the discussions thereof have ever evidenced—
suggestiveness for the interpretation of far more psychology than is 
connoted by the term 'emotional.' Indeed, we are tempted to assert 
that that 'theory' (still so-called, although it should surely deserve by 
this day to be called a law!) could without much alteration be used 
as the central core of all psychology. The point may be summarized 
in advance: the representation of the phenomena of psychology in 
terms of (external) stimulus and (overt) response that has had such 
vogue is grossly inadequate; it fails to take account of intraorganic 
reactions and stimulations, and of the fact that most objectively 
observable stimulus-response phenomena have interlarded layers of 
shunt line processes via the viscera and soma. 
But to make the point clearer let it be stated in more detail. First, 
let us make a statement of the James doctrine of emotion. It consists 
essentially of the two propositions that external stimuli can and do 
arouse a variety of 'inside' changes, and that alterations of 'inside' 
physiological activity can be and are in many cases the sources of 
afferent impulses leading back to the central system. Stated in some 
such way this doctrine avoids the objections of the extreme 
behaviorists who can see nothing valuable in it; it does not stand or 
fall with the legitimacy of the introspective approach, for the real 
contribution consists of James' insight into this one fundamental 
thing—that an afferent impulse from an ex-teroceptor does not 
discharge completely into paths to effectors producing overt 
reactions, but in some degree discharges into efferent paths leading 
to motor organs internally placed and produces there changes that 
usually arouse adjacent sense-organs, these in turn bombarding the 
central 
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system and contributing this internal quota to the sum total of 
mutually reinforcing and inhibiting processes a-going through the 
centers. "A process set up anywhere in the centers reverberates 
everywhere, and in some way or other affects the organism 
throughout, making its activities either greater or less." That the 
subject is aware of these internally aroused afferent impulses, as 
implied in many of James' statements of the doctrine, is after all not 
essential to this insight and should not damn it for those who are 
sensitive of any references to the experiental side. 
 
FIG. 3. Stage I. The afferent impulse aroused by the stimulus S may at C lead 
immediately to overt action upon object O, but also may lead to reaction of viscera V, 
in turn furnishing new afferent supply to and through C. 
Stage II. This new afferent supply inevitably affects and is affected by other 
impulses in passage, thus modifying the overt reaction on 0 as well as further modifying 
the internal changes. 
To make clearer the fact that this conception of emotion may 
without loss of essence be stated in wholly objective terms, the 
writer has schematized the matter down to its skeleton in Figure 3, 
and has introduced some details in Figure 4. 
Before applying this analysis of emotion to the description of 
thinking we must get the process of thinking 'placed' in a general 
way, its locus in the general life economy of the human being. The 
emphasis placed by the functional psychology upon the part 
thinking plays in the life history of the individual would seem to be 
as genuinely 'behavioristic' 
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FIG. 4. An external stimulus (as a ghost) arouses an afferent nerve impulse from 
eye to brain in turn arousing a team of motor pathways. These then produce changes 
in lachrymal gland (LG), in sweat glands (SG), in position of hair on head (Hr), in blood 
vessels of skin as in blanching (B), in skeletal muscles as in straining, 'excited' activity 
(SM), in heart beat (Hi), in stomach's digestion involving both muscles and glands 
(St), in secretion of adrenin at (A) and glycogen from liver (Lv) into blood, in skeletal 
muscles of chest controlling breathing (CM), in vocal sounds from larynx (F), etc. 
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as the newer physiological conception stated in the first pages of 
this paper. At any rate, the two treatments of the subject dovetail 
excellently, and in the writer's opinion, strengthen each other, the 
one stating the original occasion as well as the final outcome of 
thinking, the other describing the particular processes so 
occasioned and leading to such an outcome. 
The type example of the functionalist's interpretation of 
thinking is that of a man baffled by some characteristic of the 
environment. Characteristically, if his behavior is of a rational type, 
he is not content to kick and squeal, pull and tug, run to and fro; he 
'stops to think it over,' he may 'sit down to consider.' Does this 
mean that all motor activity is stopped? Hardly! It means rather that 
it is 'toned down,' partially inhibited from full explosion. The 
degree to which this abbreviation of his acts is carried varies, of 
course, by all gradations. At one time we may observe him 
tentatively but actually starting to do this, then that, then the other; 
again, we may see him sitting still but shifting his eyes here, there, 
elsewhere, with slight turnings of head and body, with minor 
movements of fingers and hand; or, he may by all superficial 
appearances be motionless and his reactions escape all observation 
but that aided by delicate instrumentation applied to tongue, larynx, 
artery, chest, and finger tips. Then at the conclusion of this period 
of more or less implicit reactions our man may be seen to resume 
his more large-scale, gross behavior, and he deals with the situation 
now in some definitive and manifest way; his problem is solved 
and he is acting accordingly. 
No consideration of thinking can proceed far without a wrestle 
with the problem of 'meaning.' To be sure, a be-haviorist (Watson) 
may deny the usefulness of the term and insist that "the question of 
meaning is an abstraction, a 
Dotted lines show how the changes aroused in different parts of the body may contribute 
new afferent impulses to the centers. In terms of the usual analysis of the subject's awareness, 
these secondary impulses give him the feeling or emotional quality modifying or coloring the 
externally aroused sensations. Objectively speaking, these secondary impulses now play a 
modifying part in further stimulus-response phenomena. 
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rationalization and a speculation serving no useful scientific 
purpose. . . . From the . . . behaviorist's point of view the problem 
never arises. We watch what the animal or human being is doing. 
He means what he does. . . . His action is the meaning." Now, as 
shown above, frequently the action does not occur, or does not 
completely occur; hence not only is his action but also are his 
tendencies-to-action and his general motor attitude the meaning of 
the stimulus. At any rate, the term serves as a useful shorthand 
expression; and no doubt the behaviorist's discarding of it is 
motivated in part by the fact that it has heretofore been used almost 
exclusively in a structuralistic and introspective manner. Some 
tendency to break away from the use of the term as referring only 
to certain aspects of conscious experience has been shown in the 
seeking of description of it as an 'attitude,' an 'adjustment,' as by 
Bolton. 
An excellent approach to this position is via the study of 
children's definitions. It is too well known for elaboration that the 
child of four or six will define nearly everything he is questioned 
on in terms of its use, i.e. in terms of his own dealings with it. A 
chair is 'what you sit on,' a hor is 'to ride on,' a pencil is 'something 
you can write with, etc. A child of the writer's during his second 
December frequently telephoned Santa Claus a detailed schedule of 
Christmas expectations, and whenever he mentioned the word 
'football' involuntarily kicked the wall. It may be maintained that 
that is what a football is—a kickable thing; should such an article 
become permanently deflated it has lost (in Aristotelian 
phraseology) its virtue, it is no longer a football but a wad of stuff 
to be thrown away; and the naïve youngster will turn into a 
'football' anything that is kickable, whether describable by his 
elders as made of leather-and-rubber, of black rubber only, of a 
hog's bladder, or of a cotton stuffed calico bag. To be sure, the 
adults do apply these names of composition and structure, but are 
not they and all other 'ideas' or terms really shorthand symbols for 
the mass of dealings-with that the adult may at one time or another 
employ, a naming reaction that has by conditioning come to do 
duty for a mass of overt manipulations ? 
A DESCRIPTION OF THINKING 65 
It is now high time to be calling attention to a new point in our 
description of thinking, a point that has all along been lurking in 
the " background. No small part of a child's reaction upon a thing, 
of his attitude toward it on later occasions, or of the meaning it has 
for him when mentioned, is the affective-emotional phase. And we 
can extend the point to cover the topic of perceiving in general. The 
skull-and-crossbones in red on a poison label, the funniness of the 
clown, the attention-arresting character of the name LOUVAIN in 
the latter months of 1914, all these point us to the observation that 
these affective aspects of a thing perceived do not merely 
accompany the perceiving act but are part and parcel of it. One 
might put this still more vigorously by showing that one's 
perception of a thing is dependent upon this as one of the integral 
factors; the meaning given a thing is based upon the overt motor 
responses that thing arouses in whole or part and also upon the 
covert visceral and somatic responses it arouses. Going back again 
to our Fig. 4, it is evident that the stimulating thing really arouses 
one complex response (or series of responses), each response then 
'being only formally analyzable for pedagogical or experimental 
purposes in psychology into the more observable 'outside' and the 
more private 'inside' parts of the whole. In human experience, the 
sun is first of all a cheery fellow, greeting us in the morning, 
warming us in the chilly breeze, mayhap sunburning us at times, 
ripening our corn, drying our clothes, playing generally a striking 
part in this world of weal and woe and of things-to-be-done. Only 
with later stages of mental development when most habits become 
abbreviated and short-circuited and symbolized under the needs of 
social communication and of greater rapidity of action does the sun 
become the incandescent body in space familiar to us in astronomy. 
On this evolution, some words below. 
The foregoing remarks suggest that we are face to face again 
with one of those distinctions of convenience which have so often 
in the history of knowledge become crystallized and fossilized into 
hard and fast divisions.    This attack upon the 
5 
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over-intellectualized psychology of perceiving carries within its 
womb—and for the present the writer will not play the part of a 
mid-wife—a discussion matter involving fundamentals of all 
brands of psychology, at least all approached by introspective 
methods. Perhaps, after all, there is no legitimate and final line of 
demarcation between 'cognitive' and ' affective,' between intellect 
and emotion, any more than there is a clear line between the motor 
responses called overt and those called implicit. Has the distinction 
not been drawn originally as one of convenience? 
Viewed objectively, the 'meaning'' of a thing is determined 
by—is constituted of—the whole motor-emotive set or attitude 
aroused by that thing, these attitudes being nothing other than 
habits formed in response to the thing. 
Language.—One of the commonest recognitions in the history 
of psychology has been that of the peculiar intimacy of thought 
development and language development. And such questions have 
at times been posed as, Can one have thoughts without words to 
frame them by? Yet the possibility of reducing them one to the 
other, making them not one the real process and the other only its 
tool, but both merely two ways of regarding the same human 
performance, had not vividly possessed psychologists—due, no 
doubt, to that lurking feeling of the sacrosanct and always-
somewhat-mysterious about thinking. Today, however, it is 
becoming increasingly evident to some that in language itself, in its 
origins and developments, we may find the key to the problem of 
the physiological processes we call thinking. 
To understand the original and primitive significance of 
language we must first be reminded of those inherited pattern-
reactions that may be styled instinctive-emotional (again, with 
these two words we have with us a petrified distinction that in truth 
cannot be made out in definite lines). Now, given animals or 
humans manifesting these earliest appearing tendencies in 
behavior, tendencies to reactions in manifold ways differing by all 
degrees in observableness from the gross movements of pushing 
away by arm or leg to the subtle changing of a hormone secretion; 
given also a situation in 
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which these organisms live in proximity so that they may stimulate 
and react upon each other; and an exceedingly important series of 
phenomena occurs. Let us imagine that Rover is eating a piece of 
meat, and assume that none of the learning process we want to 
trace has yet taken place on his part nor on that of the dog, Towser, 
appearing in the offing. What is more inevitable than that Towser, 
whose olfactory and visual receptors are assailed by the food, 
should approach and bite into the meat? But now the situation is 
accurately set for arousing in Rover (and, it may be assumed, not 
as an acquired but as a native tendency) a pugnacious or attacking 
response (involving the whole complex of visceral-and-skeletal 
action systems) and it proceeds to the point where an effectual 
biting attack has removed the Towser obstacle or interruption. 
Here occurs a change in the latter's neuromotor organization 
known by the term 'conditioning'; the original situation for Towser 
in which his cutaneous sense-organs were receiving the intense 
pain stimulation and thus arousing his own withdrawal movements 
included also such incidental stimuli as the visual from bristling 
hairs and bared teeth on Rover's part and the auditory from the 
latter's growl; and on later occasions of similar character the re-
presentation merely of growl and bristling hair may be potent to 
excite the complete act of withdrawal. 
Henceforth, whenever Towser's proximity is objectionable 
Rover need only growl and bristle to control the former's conduct 
satisfactorily, and the growling-and-bristling soon becomes an 
habitual attitude, usable toward a variety of animals and persons 
and usable in situations not actually demanding a full biting attack, 
but in which a retreating behavior by the other subject is desirable. 
And now, if only Rover were able to want intentionally to frighten 
the 'other-fellow,' he could deliberately do it by voluntary control 
of his growling and his bristling mechanisms. At all events, this 
intentional using of some of the whole complex of overt-and-
visceral reactions involved in actual direct dealing with the other-
one is observable early enough in childhood; crying to bring 
mother, drawing back hand to threaten a younger 
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brother, forcing a smile to secure more favorable treatment— such 
instances are legion. 
If there is this development of ability to use abbreviations of 
instinctive-emotional reactions to influence others there is to be 
remarked also the development of ability to be sensitive to these 
abbreviated acts when made on the part of others. Indeed, so 
essential in human social life is the development of both the active 
and the receptive sides that we find children surprisingly quick to 
read and to convey meanings with gestures and vocal sounds, much 
quicker than to do so with articulate words. We may conceive the 
latter as artificial symbols, shorthand indications of the former; and 
it is interesting to observe how in different social cultures varying 
amounts of this substitution have occurred, from the American 
Indian of many grunts, shrugs, manual gestures and few words, to 
the Chinese or Englishmen of stolid face, reserving his meanings, 
his personal attitudes to be detected almost only from his articulate 
vocal sounds. 
This interstimulation and response (suggested years ago by 
Mead) becomes a very broad fact, inclusive of a wide range of 
phenomena of social nature. A few illustrations may assist us. In a 
flirtation both individuals put their best foot forward and with 
sufficient tentativeness; A's advances being made first with hardly 
noticeable casualness, then, if B's reactions thereto be not of an 
unfavorable tenor, later with more boldness, but always the bits of 
conduct of each principal serving in turn as cues to the other. 
Consider the attitudes of not-too-pugnacious men found facing each 
other in a quarrel that has collected a crowd: let one lower more 
darkly and approach ever so little, the other visibly grows more 
tense and pugnacious, then let either relax from this fist-clenched 
vigilance and the other is fairly sure to follow with the same degree 
of relaxation. Incidentally, we find in this general description of 
social interstimulation and response the principle of 'minimal 
stimuli.' In ballroom dancing, the leader may be largely unaware of 
his slight changes of movement of right or left hand or of body 
generally, yet these serve as sufficient cues to his partner so that 
without being 
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aware of them on her own part she nevertheless follows accurately. 
The development of articulate language proceeds largely out of 
this social setting. By degrees certain vocal signs come to be the 
symbols for certain motor-emotive attitudes, and thus gesture and 
the more native vocal sounds tend to be replaced by these 
conventionalized signals. We need not here follow up this 
development, but in general we see the stabilizing and 
conventionalizing of human social attitudes, the evolving of 
artificial signs to signify personal motor-emotive reaction 
tendencies. 
For an understanding of the process of thinking, now, it is 
essential to note one aspect of the further development of language: 
the gradual shift from overt speech and gesture to covert forms. 
The movements and gross bodily acts that become conveniently 
abbreviated and delimited to vocal and manual signs to the other 
fellow, in certain social situations gradually become further 
condensed and more nascent. The average three-year-old has 
progressed far in the substituting of mimetic movements and verbal 
reactions for his earlier actual manipulations of objects; but he is 
due to go much further in this direction of abridgment, through the 
mumbling, sotto voce, and the lip-moving stages to that of silent 
reading and silent speech. 
It is important to note that this abbreviating of behavior now is 
no longer principally a social phenomenon. It is observable 
characteristically when the child is playing by himself. While 
building his blocks or adjusting his doll clothes, his activity is 
interleaved with words, with facial grimaces, with manual 
demonstrations; some of this being of the nature merely of 
accompanying activity, but much of it too of an anticipatory and a 
tentative sort. By degrees it becomes evident that one anticipatory 
act may lead to another, this to a third, and so on; and the same 
interplay of stimulus and response by mere signals or symbols used 
in a social relationship, now appears within the one child's own 
organism. The sight of a block askew may initiate an emotionally 
facilitated act of knocking the whole thing over, but this may 
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not get beyond the mere start to do it, on account of a 'set' to keep 
on building based on the previous building acts; the left hand may 
start to adjust the poorly placed block, only to be 'headed off' 
before fairly begun by the influence of a developing dextrality 
shown in the using of the right hand instead; in case the result of 
the right hand's work is to disarrange the block further we may 
observe a drooping mouth, a sudden expiration, a falling cadence of 
vocal sound, and can guess at the unobservable 'inside' changes; 
and some further manipulations are then called out, ending perhaps 
in a drawing back of body and head, a deeper breathing, a reduction 
of muscular tonus, and audible vocal sounds. Now, most of these 
acts are neither actual dealings with the situation nor signals to a 
social object—they are mutually interacting and reciprocally 
influencing within the one child alone. 
When one first learns to add a column of figures he 'says' the 
numbers and sums aloud, but with practice subdues this 
pronunciation to a whispering and lip movement stage which some 
of us never outgrow, and later still represses even these outwardly 
observable vocal acts, leaving only the necessary eye excursions 
and pencil pointings and writings to be seen. 
Evidences bearing directly toward our thesis may be found on 
many sides. The case of Inaudi, the lightning calculator, is 
instructive: Meumann reports that he was unable to do his 
prodigious feats in 'mental' multiplication when he was hoarse. The 
well-known line of experiments with the automatograph by Jastrow 
and others have been introduced in connection with a variety of 
psychological topics but they surely bear witness to the fact that the 
direction and play of our 'ideas' is with sufficiently adequate 
technique shown to be a motor phenomenon. The recognition that 
attention is a matter of a-tension is in point. The training of animals 
to respond to minimal cues, as with the Elberfeld horses or the 
German police dogs reported by Most, has significance for human 
psychology in the fact that the men present were thinking more or 
less overtly! Thus, too, with the aphorism that mind reading is 
muscle reading. 
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In attempting the solution of Morgan's railroad puzzle1 students 
of the writer showed great individual variations, but all found 
themselves, or were seen to be, making motor responses 
throughout—in the form either of eye-ball to-and-fro movements, 
or of hand and finger partial pointings, or of scarcely voiced verbal 
tryings-out. 
What, now, are the mutual interactions of these more abridged 
and implicit responses? They are in no wise different from the 
interactions of responses generally. Upon analysis the following 
principles are among those that appear. 
1. One act or motor set may lead naturally (i.e. by virtue of 
well-formed central connections) to another—the explanation 
being mainly, habit. The phenomena of memory for serial 
impressions is an obvious example; one may add, the train of one's 
thoughts show some factors of association, which are none other 
than factors well known in determining the rearousal of old habits. 
The learning of a bit of 'knowledge,' of a fact, likewise requires no 
other principles than the conditioning of reactions. 
2. One act or motor set may lead away from another. Again, 
witness the identity of principles involved in memory and 
association, on the one hand, and in the succession of acts, on the 
other. 
3. One  act  or  motor  set  may  inhibit,   interfere  with, 
1 A one-track railroad has a switch which will hold 25 cars and an engine. This switch is 
connected at each end with the main track. Two 50-car trains (A and B), each having but one 
engine, meet and must pass at this switch. Mark in order from 1 to 9 the steps that would have 
to be taken to pass the trains. 
..........Engine B couples with second half of train A. 
..........Engine B uncouples from the second half of train A and backs out of the switch. 
..........Train A divides into two halves. 
..........Engine B backs train B over the switch until it has placed the second half of 
train A on the switch. 
..........Engine A pulls the first section of train A off the switch on to the main track. 
..........Engine A backs the first section of train A and couples with the second section 
of train A. 
..........Engine A pulls the first section of train A on to the switch. 
..........Train B running on the main track passes the engine and first section of train A. 
..........Engine B pulls train B past the second section of train A. 
This puzzle is taken from 'Morgan's Mental Test,' by John J. B. Morgan, State University 
of Iowa. The object of the puzzle is to rearrange the steps in correct order. 
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or antagonize another. The antipathetic or contradictory relations 
between many of the meanings we think in terms of, is paralleled 
physiologically by antagonistic relations between reaction systems, 
even those as simple as Sherrington's reflexes, and including 
visceral changes. 
4. One act or motor set may facilitate, support, reinforce 
another.    The same remarks apply here as in 3. 
5. The integration of one's knowledge into a more and more 
inclusive conceptual organization is physiologically paralleled by 
the integration of part-reactions into higher-level habits, the 
hierarchical type of organization being striking in both cases. 
6. The schematizing and condensing of meanings that goes on 
in the maturing and elaborating of one's thought life, 
introspectively observed, is not in essence different from the short-
circuiting of part-reactions in the organization of habit-wholes. In 
adding, we have a borderline example of both: after adding digit to 
digit, one comes to 'read' his number combinations, taking in two, 
three, and more figures as one meaning. Similarly with the building 
up of word reactions in Book's pioneer study of typewriting. 
Truly, it only remains for some one to work out a complete set 
of experimental demonstrations of the phenomena and principles of 
habit making and breaking, to show thereby that the laws of 
conscious psychic life are after all nothing other than these. Meyer 
has opened the way in his 'Psychology Demonstrations.' 
Resume.—1. Thinking is coming to be recognized today as a 
human function that involves some substituting of implicit for 
explicit reactions. 
2. This substituting occurs most clearly when the explicit 
activities are inadequate, often in conflict. 
3. The implicit reactions can be given a physiological 
treatment most consistent with other physiological facts when 
described in terms of reflex arcs: thinking being a matter of 
interacting and mutually influencing motor sets or responses, not of 
intracerebral shiftings of association impulses. 
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4. The James-Lange theory of emotion by extension of 
application reminds us that thinking is done by the whole body, 
and not by the vocal apparatus and gestural apparatus alone. 
5. It reminds us also that thinking is done not merely with 
striped muscles but also with visceral muscular and glandular 
effectors, and that one cannot deny the emotional and affective 
contributions to the whole performance. 
6. That motor-emotive responses of abbreviated types can be 
the determinants of meanings appears from the development of 
gestural and vocal communications of signs. 
7. The social communication-meanings become meanings for 
the individual's soliloquy, and this leads to a change from overt to 
more or less implicit. 
8. The phenomena of thinking are consequently restatable as 
the physiological phenomena of interacting reaction circuits, or the 
behavioristic phenomena of interrelated motor acts and motor sets 
of varying degrees of explicitness. 
